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further information, and the "failure
to make inquiries subjected them to all
the responsibilities arising from the acquisition of such knowledge as would
have been obtained if the inquiry had
actually been made."
In one word
the subject seems to resolve itself entirely into a question of evidence-Did
or did not the defendant, in such a transaction, usurp a rival's name with a fraudulent object ? If, after a certain intimation has been given him he persists in
shutting his eyes and fails to make any
inquiries, he must, according to Howard
v. Park, be taken to have desired no
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further information, and to have assumed
the responsibilities arising from the acquisition of such knowledge, or resulting
from wilful ignorance of the real state
of facts. And yet, strange to say, in
Howard v. Park, the plaintiffs were
neither the inventors, the manufacturers,
nor had they any exclusive right to the
sale of the manufactured article, but had
simply arranged with the manufacturdr
that their trade-name (not mark) should
be affixed to all packages consigned to
such firm. Neither was the defendant a
party to the affixing such name to those
designed for him.
IUGH WEIGU~TMAN.
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Supreme Court of Missouri.
MUSICK v. DODSON.
A married woman is, by the common law, wholly incapable of making any contract whatever which will bind her personally, or create against her a personal
debt or obligation. Such attempted contract is void and not voidable.
A mere moral obligation is not a sufficient consideration to support a promise,
unless there is some antecedent legal liability to which it can be attached.
Where, therefore, a married woman employed an attorney to procure a divorce
for her, and promised to pay him $25 therefor; and after the divorce was obtained
she again promised to pay the same: Held, that her first promise was void; that her
second promise was conqequently founded on a mere moral obligation, which was an
insufficient consideration; and she having remarried, her second husband was not
liable for the payment of such attorney fee.
APPEAL

from Adair Circuit Court.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, C. J.-Action before a justice of the peace, based
on the following statement: "Plaintiff states that he is an attor-

ney at law, duly licensed according to law ; that heretofore, to wit, on
the -- day - 1877, one Louisa Allen employed plaintiff to bring
and prosecute an action for divorce from her then husband, James
Allen ; that the cause of said divorce was that she had been deserted

by her husband for more than three years before the bringing of this
suit for divorce, or contracting with plaintiff to bring said suit for
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divorce, and that plaintiff did bring said suit, and did successfully
prosecute the same, and she was divorced from her said husband;
that plaintiff's services therein were reasonably worth $25, which
amount she agreed to pay plaintiff before and after the divorce was
granted, but which is due and unpaid; that afterward, on the day of 1878, defendant, Thomas Dodson, was duly and legally
married with said Louisa Allen, and is now her husband: wherefore plaintiff prays judgment against said Thomas Dodson for said
sum of $25, and costs."
A married woman is wholly incapable of making any contract
whatever which will bind her personally, or create against her a
personal debt or obligation: Bauer v. Bauer, 40 Mo. 61; Hfiggins v. Pettzer, 49 Id. 152. And it has been expressly decided
that a married woman's promise to pay an attorney his fee for
obtaining a divorce for her would not be binding upon her: Whip4pie v. Giles, 55 N. H. 139. This being the case, the engagement
made with plaintiff by Mrs. Dodson, now wife of defendant, then
wife of James Allen, to pay plaintiff as an attorney a certain sum
for obtaining a divorce from her former husband, Allen, can not
be regarded as a debt of the wife of Allen, and if not a personal
debt of hers, then according to plaintiff's own position, the
defendant could not be held legally liable for anything less
than the debt of his wife contracted anterior to his marriage
with her; and if Mrs. Allen could not, during the existence of the
marital relations with her then husband, bind herself personally,
then, as a matter of course, there could not be any consideration
for the promise made by Mrs. Allen after the divorce was obtained
to pay for such services, so the subsequent promise would be a
nudum pactum and of no binding obligation or debt creating force.
The case of Wilson v. Burr,25 Wend. 386, gives support to plaintiff's position, that a moral obligation on the part of afeme covert
is sufficient to uphold her promise made after the removal of her
disability. That case is based on Lee v. 3uggeridge,5 Taunt. 36,
which, Mr. Parsons says, "is not law:" 1 Pars. on Cont. 445. It
was subsequently abridged and modified in Littlefield v. Shee, 2
B. &. Ad. 811, and denied in .Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. & El.
438. DENMAN, C. J. : It is said by Mr. Story that when contracts
are merely voidable and not void in their inception, "they may
be revived by a subsequent promise, provided they were originally
founded upon an express or implied request by the party benefited.
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But where the contract is void ab initio, it is not capable of ratification. Thus, where a married woman gave a promissory note,
and after her husband's death promised, in consideration of forbearance of the payee, to pay it, it was held that the note was absolutely void, and that forbearance where there was no other cause of
action originally, is not a sufficient consideration to raise a promise:
* * * so also where certain goods were supplied to a feme covert
living apart from her husband, and for which, after his death, she
promised to pay; it was held that the subsequent promise was void,
because the goods being supplied during the life of her husband,
the price constituted a debt from him and not from her :" 1 Story
on Oont., sect 593, and cases cited.
Mr. Baron PARKE said a "mere moral consideration is nothing :" Jenningqs v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501. Ohancellor KENT says
that the weight of authority is opposed to the view that a " mere
moral obligation is of itself a sufficient consideration for a promise
except in those cases in which a prior legal obligation or consideration had once existed :" 2 Kent 465. The doctrine of the case of
Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend. 386, was departed from in the subsequent cases of Watkins v. Halstead,2 Sandf. 311; mith v. Allen,
1 Lans. 101; Geer v. Archer, 2 Barb. 420, where that doctrine
is repudiated, and before that case was adjudicated a different view
of the law bad been taken in Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97, and
Smith v. Ware, 13 Johns. 257, which cases were not noticed in
that on which plaintiff rests.
The views we have expressed touching the point on hand are
also supported by Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207, where the subject
of a sufficiency of a mere moral obligation as the basis for a subsequent promise is very clearly and elaborately discussed, and also by
numerous other cases cited in the text books from which we have
quoted.

In

Greenabaum v. Elliot, 60 Mo. 25, WAGNER, C. J.,

delivering the opinion of the court, said: "A moral obligation,
of itself, is not a good consideration for a promise. To impart to
it any binding character there must be some antecedent legal liability to which it can be attached." Parsons says the rule may now
be stated as follows : " A1moral obligation to pay money or perform
a duty is a good consideration for a promise to do so, where thbre
was originally an obligation to pay the money or to do the duty,
which was enforceable at law, but for the interference of som6 rule
of -law. Thus, a promise to pay a debt contracted during infancy,
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or barred by the statute of limitations, or bankruptcy, is good,
without other consideration than the previous legal obligation, but
the morality of the promise, however certain, or however urgent
the duty, does not of itself suffice for a consideration. In fact the
rule amounts at present to little more than a permission to a party
to waive certain positive rules of law which would protect him from
a plaintiff claiming a just and legal debt :" 1 Parsons on Cont.
434.
And the same learned author also remarks: "Perhaps an illustration of the rule that a moral obligation does not form a valid
consideration for a promise, unless the moral duty was once a legal
one, may be found in the case of a widow who promises to pay for
money expended at her request, or lent to her during her marriage.
It may have been held in England, in a case examined in a former
note, that this promise was binding, and there are many dicta to
that effect in this country, but the current of recent decisions in
England is in favor of the view that the promise of a married
woman has not, when given, any legal force, and therefore, is not
voidable but void, and can not be ratified by a subsequent promise
after the coverture has ceased, nor be regarded as a sufficient consideration for a new promise :" Id. 435.
And this court has announced a similar rule in .Kennerly v. fartin, 8 Mo. 698, where it was held that the subsequent promise by
a widow to pay a physician for professional services rendered during
her coverture was not founded upon a valuable consideration. The
case at bar is not distinguishable in principle from the last case or
others cited in support of our views. The case of Gwinn v. Simes,
61 Mo. 335, is in accord with this one, for there the reception of
the money on Sunday constituted a precedent, good consideration
which might have been enforced at law through the medium of an
implied promise had it not been suspended by some positive rule of
law, and therefore the express promise, to wit, the mortgage,
revived the precedent good consideration: 3 Bos. & Pul. 249,
supra.
It has been ruled that a wife could, by such an agreement as
that in which plaintiff has declared, bind her then husband for an
attorney's fees for services rendered her in a proceeding for a
divorce, instituted by the husband against her (Porter v. Briggs,
38 Iowa, 166, and cases cited; s. u., 2 Cent. L. J. 681), but no
case has gone to the extent of holding that any subsequent husband
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would be bound in consequence of such an agreement made by one
who, at the time of making it, was the wife of another.'
At the common law, if the husband had abjured the realm, or
was an alien continuously abroad, these circumstances invested the
wife with the protection and powers incident to a feme sole : Gallager v. Delargy, 57 Mo. 29, and cases cited. And the same
rule has been extended, where the husband resided without the
state of the wife's residence, he having deserted her (Abbot v.
Bayley, 6 Pick. 89 : Gregory v. Pierce,4 Met. 478), and the point
has been ruled in the same way by this court where the wife resided
separate and apart from her husband without this state: Bose
Bates, 12 Mo. 30.
But these cases just cited were put upon the express ground of
the continued intentional absence of the husband from the state,
the line of jurisdiction being on a political point an impassable barrier, and the husband bWing in consequence thereof as much beyond
the process and jurisdiction of the courts of the wife's residence as
if he had abjured the realm or were an alien residing abroad.
This distinction is made plainly to appear in Bayley v. Abbot,
supra, where the husband, resident in New Hampshire, by cruelty
drove his wife from home, who thereupon came to Massachusetts,
resided there for many years, acting as a feme sole, and had
received the note in question as the proceeds of her own labor.
These facts being set forth in plaintiff's reply to defendant's plea
in abatement, that plaintiff was under coverture of Peter Abbot,
who resided in New Hampshire, the defendant rejoined that the
husband was a citizen of the United States, residing therein, and,
had not at any time renounced or abjured his allegiance thereto,
etc. A demurrer was interposed to this rejoinder, and PARKER,
C. J., discussing this, point, said: "The question is whether the
replication is an answer to the plea in abatement of coverture of
the plaintiff. If these parties to the marriage lived within this
Commonwealth, it is certain that the facts stated in the replication
would not avoid the plea of coverture, for by the plaintiff's expulsion from the house of her husband, she would have carried with
her a credit against him to the extent of her necessary supportfurthermore, might have obtained a divorce, a mensa et thora,
and a reasonable alimony out of his estate," and the rejoinder was
adjudged bad. No such case is presented in this record, nor does
the case of Gallagherv. Delargy, supra, cited for plaintiff, resem-
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ble the one before us, for there the husband resided in this state,
where the wife resided for many years transacting business as a
ferne sole.
True, it is alleged, that Allen deserted his wife, but this he
might have done and still have resided in this State. The disposition made by the Circuit Court of defendant's motion to dismiss
the cause was therefore correct.
Judgment affirmed.
After her husband's decease, she wrote
promising that her executors should settle
the bond. Upon this state of facts the
Court of Common Pleas held that asReeves's
;
181
Coy.
and
Inf.
39 ; Bing.
sumpsit would lie aganst the executors
Dom. Rel. *98; Rose v. Bell, 38 Barb.
on this promise of the testatrix, upon the
566;
Me.
34
v.
Wildes,
25; Howe
Young v. Paul, 10 N. J. Ch. 404 ; Far- ground that the moral obligation to pay
the debt was a sufficient consideration for
rar v. Bessey, 24 Vt. 89 ; Cartwriqht v.
Hollis, 5 Tex. 152; Chouteau v. 1orry, the subsequent promise. The doctrine
3 Mo. 254; Davis v. Foy, 15 Miss. 64 ; of this ease is suppoted by a number of
Rogers v. Phillips, 8 Ark. 366 ; Tltomp- cases and dicta: see 2 Bl. Com. 445 ;
Atkins v. Banwell, 2 East 506, per Lord
son v. Warren, 8 B. Mon. 488; King v.
v.
M3osely, 5 Ala. 610; Perry v. Calhoun, ELTnxonouGni, C. J.; Hawkes
Saunders, I Cowp. 294, per Lord MAles8 Humph. 551; Glyde v. Keister, 1
The rule that the contracts of a feme
covert are, by the common law, void, is
well settled: I Dish. Mar. Worn., sect.

Grant's Cas. 465 ; Edwards v. Davis, 16
Johns. 281 ; Wallace v. Rippon, 2 Bay
112; R'owe v. Kolde, 4 Cal. 285 ; Hennessey v. Ryan, 7 R. I. 548 ; Thomas v.
Lowy, 60 Ill. 512 ; Tracy v. Keith, 11
Allen 214; Htiggins v. Willis, 35 Ind.
371.
Notwithstanding, however, that the
rule seems clear upon principle, there has
been considerable conflict among the authorities upon the question involved in
the principal case, whether the moral
obligation created by an agreement entered into by a married woman is a sufficient consideration to support a new
promise made by her after the coverture
is ended. The case of Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36 ; s. c. Ewell's Lead.
Cas. 332, is the case usually cited to support the affirmative of this question. In
that ease a feme covert, having an estate
settled to her separate use, gave a bond
for the repayment by her executors of
money advanced at her request on the
security of that bond, to her son-in-law.

riELfl, C. J., and BuLLER, J.; Gibbs

v. Merrill, 3 Taunt. 311, per ,AxSPiELD, C. J. ; Seaman v. Price, 2 Bing.
439, per BEST, C. J. ; Bentley v. Morse,
14 Johns. 468; Glass v. Beach, 5 Vt.
176 ; Barlow v. Smith, 4 (1. 144 ; Turner v. Partridge,3 P. & W. 172 ; Commissioners v. Perry, 5 Ohio 58; Fairchild
v. Bell, I Rice (S. C.) Dig. 60; Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines 150; Wilson v.
Burr, 25 Wend. 386; Goulding v. Davidson, 26 N. Y. 604; Hempill v. JlfeClimans, 24 Penn. St. 371; Vance v.
Wells, 6 Ala. 737 ; Kennedy v. Mlartin,
8 'Mo. 698 ; Franldin v. Beatty, 27 Miss.
347.
Notwithstanding the above authorities,
the weight of authority seems to be that
a mere moral obligation is insufficient to
support a subsequent promise, and that
the contract of a married woman being
void is incapable of ratification, however
certain and urgent the mere moral obligation of the promise; and hence that
the case of Lee v. M1uggeridge is not the

DOUGAN v. DISTRICT COURT OF LAKE CO.
law: See Yelv. 41 b (Metcalfs ed.) ;
I Pars. on Cont. 434, 435 ; Met, on
Cont. 178, 181 ; Chitty on Cont.(Il Am.
ed.) 52, 55; 2 B1. Com. (Cooley's ed.)
445, note 6; 1 Story on Cont. (4th ed.)
sect. 465 ; 1 Bish. Mfar. Worn. sect. 39;
Loyd v. Lee, 1 Stra. 94; Meyer v.
Hfaworth, 8 Ad. & El. 467; Maher v.
Martin, 43 Ind. 314; Thompson v. Warren, 8 3. Mon. 488; Waters v. Bean,
15 Ga. 360; Fosterv. Wilcox, 10 R. 1.
444; Hetherington v. Rixon, 46 Ala.
298 ; Watson v. Dunlap, 2 Cranch C. C.
14; Tiser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 274;
Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 813, per
Lord TENTERDEN, C. J. ; Mfonkman v.
Shepherdson, 11 A. & E. 415 ; Beaumont
v. Reeve, 8 Q. B. 486, 487; Eastwoodv.
Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 447 ; Jennings v.
Brown, 9 M. &W. 501, per PAurE, B.;
Cook v. Bradley, 7OConn. 57 ; Mills v.
Wyman, 3 -Pick. 207 ; Edwards v. Davis,
16 Johns. 283, note; Smith v. Ware, 13

Johns. 259 ; McPhersonv. Bees, 2 P. &
W. 521 ; Dodge v. Adams, 19 Pick. 429 ;
Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Id. 159; Parker
v. Carter, 4 Munf. 273; Hawley v. Farrar, 1 Vt. 420; Farnham v. O'Brien, 22
Me. 475; Warren v. Whitney, 24 Id.
561 ; Snevily v. Read, 9 Watts 396 ;
Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. 97 ; Geer v.
Archer, 2 Barb. 420 ; Shepardv. Rhodes,
7 R. I. 472; Nash v. Russell, 5 Barb.
556; Watkins v. HaIstead,2 Sandf. 311;
s. o. E iell's Lead. Cas. 317.
In many of the states, the question
involved in the principal case has been
solved by statutes enabling married
women to contract asfemes sole. But in
those states where the common law prevails upon this subject, the principal case
will be read with interest, and will form
an important addition to the existing authority upon this interesting question.
MLItsHALL D. EwEL.r
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
DOUGAN

ET AL.

v. TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF LAKE COUNTY.

Where a statute authorizes an administrative or ministerial body (as the council
of a city) to appoint an officer to hold during its pleasure, such body can remove in
its discretion, and the exercise of such discretion cannot be controlled or restrained
by the courts.
The writ of prohibition lies only to an inferior judicial tribunal, and not to bodies
exercising ministerial and administrative powers only.
Where a city council is proceeding to investigate charges, with the view of removing an officer appointed to hold during the pleasure of such council, an order of
court staying proceedings and to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not

issue is made without jurisdiction, and is absolutely void; and a disregard of such
an order is not a contempt of court.
But to justify a disregard of an order of court it should appear upon the face of
the pleading, upon which it was made, that the court making the same had no jurisdiction.
Where a court is proceeding to punish the disregard of an illegal order, as for a
contempt, it is a proper case for preventive relief by prohibition.

Tin facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court.
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Hf. B. Johnson, -Daniel . Parks, A. W. Bucker and
Baynes, for petitioners.

. J.

L. . Rockwell, J. L. .2urphey, L. A. Goddard and Thomas
George, for respondent.
HELM, J.-No argument is necessary to show that if the petitioners are entitled to any relief in this cause, prohibition is the proper
proceeding therefor. The court below has taken jurisdiction of the
contempt case; it has tried petitioners and adjudged them guilty
of contempt; it has deferred sentence, but threatens to pronounce
the same. There is no final judgment subject to review in this
court by appeal, by writ of error, or by certiorari. No imprisonment has followed a sentence pronounced, and relief by habeas
corpus cannot be invoked. Yet imprisonment may be a part of the
sentence, and before aid could be given by this court after judgment, petitioners might be deprived of their liberty, and undergo
several days' confinement. A stronger case for this preventive
relief, if the District Court or judge is assuming a jurisdiction
without legal right thereto, it might be difficult to find.
The city council of Leadville had preferred charges against the
city solicitor, and were proceeding to consider the same. They
were acting in the manner provided by ordinance, and the ordinance was passed ,in accordance with law. The solicitor was
elected or appointed by the council, and held his office subject to
removal by them for certain causes; among these causes are the
ones specified in the charges preferred in the case before them,
viz.: malfeasance and incompetency in office. The record, including the petition presented to the district judge, does not justify
the conclusion that the council were assuming to act as a court and
try the solicitor for the purpose of inflicting upon him, if found
guilty, any other punishment than reprimand, suspension, or
removal from office. The district judge, upon petition, granted an
order commanding the members of the city council to show cause
why a writ of prohibition should not issue, and directing that
further proceedings by them be stayed until the hearing thereof.
The first question we deem it important to notice is that of jurisdiction in the court or judge to make the order above mentioned to
show cause, and to stay proceedings. The object of the writ of
prohibition is to restrain subordinate judicial tribunals from exceedVOL. I
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ing their jurisdiction: High Ex. Legal Rems., sects. 762, 784.
"It is used to confine inferior courts in the exercise of their
powers, within the limits fixed by law :" Leonard v. Bartels et al.,
4 Col. 95. It will be observed that the tribunal to which the writ
issues must be acting in a judicial, and not merely an administrative or ministerial capacity. See High Ex. Legal Reins. sect.,
769 ; ilome Ins. Co. v. Flint, 13 Minn. 244, and cases there cited.
The city council is not a judicial body, and it is doubtful if the
legislature, under the Constitution, could invest it with judicial
authority. In the case under consideration it was not acting or
attempting to act in a judicial capacity. The examination of
charges preferred against the city solicitor, finding him guilty
of malfeasance in office, and removing him therefrom, by the city
council, was not the exercise of judicial power. And this is true
though the offences charged may constitute causes of action cognisable by the courts. See Dbonahue v. County of Will et al., 100
Ill. 94.
The power of suspending or removing the solicitor was by
statute and ordinance vested in the city council, and investigation
into his official conduct with a view to suspension or removal, was
a proceeding entirely within their discretion and control. We
think the District Court had no jurisdiction to control the action
of the city council, and that this fact appeared sufficiently upon
the face of the petition presented to it; and it follows that its
order directing the council to desist from further proceedings was
absolutely void. Was the disqbedience of such order by the
council a contempt for which they could be arrested and punished?
Upon this question there is some conflict of authority. A few
cases are cited by counsel which seem to hold that disobedience of
the process of a court is contempt, even though the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the pleadings. See Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 IPenn. St. 20; -Ex parte Stickney, 40 Ala.
160; State of .ouisiana, ex rel. Follett et al., v. Bighter, Judge,
32 La. Ann. 1182. But we believe that the weight of authority
is against this position. The later and better doctrine seems to be
that if the court has no jurisdiction of the action, and such fact
affirmatively appears in the original petition or complaint, the process issued therein is absolutely void; and that disobedience of such
void process, or orders made in connection therewith, is no contempt. The power of punishing for contempt is inherent in all
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courts. It is absolutely necessary that they should possess it,
whether expressly given by statute or not; and when the court has
jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the action belongs, unless
a want of jurisdiction in this particular case affirmatively appears
on the face of the complaint or petition, ao error in rulings, no
irregularities in the proceedings, will divest it of this power. We
use the word "class" with reference to the subject-matter, and not
the form of action.
It will be observed from the foregoing that we do not take the
broad ground that there is no power to punish any disobedience of
orders of the court or judge, in all cases where it turns out during
the proceedings, or at the conclusion thereof, that the action must
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Sometimes days of patient
investigation are consumed before the want of jurisdiction becomes
apparent; during such investigation witnesses must appear and
testify, and all interlocutory orders essential to the proper conducting thereof, must be obeyed. See generally on this subject the
following additional authorities: -Ex parte Bowe, 7 Cal. 181;
Dickey v. Beed, 78 Ill. 261; Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285;
.Batchelder v. Hoore, 42 Cal. 412, 42; Perry v. Mitchell, 5 Denio
540 ; Brennan v. Gaston, 17 Cal. 375 ; Walton et al. v. Develling
et al., 61 Ill. 206.
We have made no effort to consider in this opinion all of the
questions presented by counsel; neither have we attempted to discuss fully or exhaustively those touched upon herein. Sufficient
has been said, however, to indicate that in our judgment this is a
proper case for granting the relief prayed for.
Let the writ of prohibition issue accordingly.
We propose to briefly review two
of the most important principles of law
involved in and determined by the above
reported decision.
I. The officer was appointed to hold
during the pleasure of the council: Gen.
Stat. 912, sect. 79. In such a mse no
court has power to prohibit or review
the exercise of such pleasure. In the
case of People v. Stout, 19 How. Pr.
171, and in the case of Walton v. Develing, 61 Ill. 201, this principle and the
reasons upon which it stands, were
clearly and fully enunciated.
If the

law gives a discretion the implication is
that the person must act without other
control than his own judgment. A discretion that can be controlled is no
discretion. If the law declares that a
certain person or body shall perform
a certain act at discretion, and a court
orders that the act shall not be done, or
shall only be done in a certain way, or
under certain circumstances, there arises
an irreconcilable conflict between the
statute and the order of the court. If
the statute is constitutional and valid,
the order of court must be void. And
0
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for the same reasons, where the act has
been performed, there is no power in
the courts to review the same: Wertheimer v. Mayor, 4c., 29 Alo: 254; State
v. Doherty, 13 Amer. Rep. 131 ; People v. Metzker, 47 Cal. 524 ; Keenan v.
Perry, 24 Texas 253; Frewin v. Lewis,
4 MAyl. & C. 249.
II. In this case the subject-matter was
the removal of the city solicitor of Leadville by the city council in pursuance
of law, and in accordance with the ordinances of the city passed in accordance
with law: Borst v. Corey, 15 N. Y. 505;
People v. Sturtevant, 9 N. Y. 263 ; 2
Abbott's Law Diet. 510; 2 Bouvier's
Law Diet. 551.
It has been held that where an order
was merely erroneous (20 Am. L. Reg.
145), or of doubtful scope and validity
(15 Central Law Jour. 42 ; Weeks v.
Smith, 3 Abb. Pr. 211; Kennedy v.
Weed, 10 Id. 62; State v. Wheeling,
4-c., 18 How. 421), a contempt for acting against it would not be discharged.
But here, the judge and court being
without jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, the order was unlawful and void,
and the disregard of the same was no
contempt: Civil Code, sect. 35 ; Exparte
Rowe, 7 Cal. 181 ; People v. O'Nriel,
47 Id. 109; Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa
208; Walton v. Develing, 61 Ill. 201 ;

Dickey v. Reed, 78 Id. 261 ; State v.
Wilcox, 24 Minn. 143; State v. Civd
Diqtrict Court, 13 Rep. 780; 15 Cent.
L. Jour. 42; Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray
120; Perry v. fMfitchell, 5 Denio 537;
Ex parte Hayne, 4 C. L. J. 72; In re
Morton, 10 AIich. 208; Coughlin v.
Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285; Holman v. Austin,
34 Texas 668 ; Batchelder v. Moore, 42
Cal. 412.
In Walton v. Develing, 61 Ill. 201,
the court, in discussing the question as
to whether an illegal order or process
of a court should be obeyed, said : I I The
process must be issued in compliance
with the law. Its vitality depends upon
this. If the act enjoined is plainly and
imperatively required by law to be performed by the officer, then the process
forbidding it is not made conformably to
law. In this case, the power to punish
for contempt is only auxiliary and incidental to jurisdiction over the subjectmatter. As there was no jurisdiction
of the matters alleged in the bill, the
subsequent action of the court was extrajudicial and void. There could, therefore, be no contempt, as there was no
jurisdiction in this case."
The principle so clearly and forcibly
stated in the above quotation is fully
recognised in all of the above-cited cases,
and needs no further comment.
H. B. JoHNsoN.

,Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DARRAHI

ET AL. v.

BAIRD.

Fixtures annexed by a tenant are not goods and chattels for all purposes. They
are not chattels unless made so by the tenant's severance, or for the benefit of his
execution creditors. While they remain attached, they are part of the freehold.
Trover does not lie for fixtures attached by a tenant, and remaining annexed to
the freehold, against the owner of the land, who has taken possession of the premises.
The fact of an agreement between landlord and tenant that the latter may remove
fixtures at the end of his term, does not either permit him to do so thereafter, nor
enable him to maintain trover against the owner of the premises in case of his refusal to permit their removal.
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ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny
County.
J.

harles Dicken and John S. Ferguson, for plaintiffs in error.

Hampton .D Dalzell, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MnErcuR J.-This action is to recover the value of fixtures on
land of the defendant. The main question is, whether the action of
trover will lie. The controlling facts are briefly these: The defenddant let to the plaintiffs a.lot on which was a b6x and a keg manufactory, for the term of three years from the first of September
1877, they agreeing to pay all taxes thereon during the term,
and the premiums for insurance on the property, and a further rental of $150 per month, payable quarterly, with a provision in case
of a failure to pay either that the defendant might, at his option,
consider and treat the plaintiffs as tenants at will, and, after thirty
days' notice, enter and repossess himself of the premises.
Most of the machinery in question was then in the buildings.
It had been put there by former tenants, from whom it was purchased by the plaintiffs at the date of their lease, at the instance
of the defendant. After taking possession, the plaintiffs'put in
other machinery of the value of several hundred dollars.
On the 3d of August 1878, the plaintiffs were duly adjudged
bankrupts by the United States District Court. On the 6th of
September following, assignees of the bankrupts were duly chosen.
They threatened to sever and dispose of the fixtures. Thereupon
the defendant petitioned the said court, averring, inter alia, the
non-payment of a large amount of taxes and premium on insurance, and of the $450 due on the 1st of September, and that he
had given notice of his election to treat plaintiffs as tenants at
will, and, on the expiration of thirty days from the date of said
notice, he would re-enter and repossess himself of the premises.
He therefore prayed for an order restraining the assignees from
removing or selling any of the machinery, and from exercising any
control or ownership over the premises. In answer thereto, the
assignees, inter alia, substantially said they bad not and did not
intend to use or occupy any of the buildings, shops and premises
further than to take therefrom all personal property belonging to
the bankrupt firm, and they did not believe it to the advantage of
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creditors to continue the lease; and that said premises remained
closed as they found them on the day of their appointment as
assignees. They denied the non-payment of taxes and premiums
on insurance; but admitted that the $450, due for rent on the 1st
day of September, had not been paid, and they claimed the right
to remove the machinery.
On the 24th of Septefnber, upon hearing the petition and
answer, and by consent of parties, it was ordered that the assignees
surrender and deliver up immediate possession of the premises,
together with the machinery, to the defendant (Baird), on his
giving bond conditioned for the forthcoming of the machinery upon
the determination of the right of property therein against him.
He gave the bond, and took possession of the premises, with the
machinery therein, and retained the same. In December 1878,
under a decree of composition with their creditors, the plaintiffs
were, by a decree of court, restored to their rights of property
under the assignees.
The question was referred to the Register in Bankruptcy, who
took testimony and reported the right of property in the machinery
to be in Baird, and the District Court so decreed. On appeal to
the Circuit Court the proceedings were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.'
It may be conceded that the machinery bought by plaintiffs of
the previous tenants, as well as that afterwards put in, all sustained
the same relation to the realty. They all became fixtures. There
is some evidence indicating the defendant had, in fact, taken possession of the premises prior to the 1st of September 1878, as the
plaintiffs gave evidence that they demanded the machinery on that
day, and it was refused. This was nearly a rAonth after they were
decreed bankrupts, and while the decree was in full force. If
defendant was not in possession why was demand made of him? It
is a well-settled rule of law, that a tenant for years who erects fixtures for the benefit of his trade or business may, at any time during the term, remove them from the demised premises ; but cannot
after the expiration thereof, unless he remains in possession and
hold over, so as to create an implied renewal of the lease: -Davisv.
.Moss, 2 Wright 846. The question now presented is this: Does
the refusal of the owner of the premises, after he has taken possession
thereof, to permit the former tenants to remove the fixtures which
they have attached to the premises during the term, enable the lat-
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ter to maintain trover against the owner of the freehold. Trover
lies for the conversion of goods as personal chattels. It does not
lie for fixtures eo nomine : 1 Chit. Plead. 146.
Title to land cannot be tried in such action when the plaintiff is
not in possession. It does not lie for property severed from the
realty, against one who has an actual adverse possession under
claim of title: Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & R. 509 ; Broivn
v. Caldwell, 10 Id. 114; Powell v. Smith, 2 Watts 126.
If fixtures, which the tenant might remove during his term, be
suffered to remain after its expiration, they become inseparable
from the freehold. They cannot afterwards be recovered by the
tenant as personal chattels, by action of trover against his landlord:
White v. Arndt, 1 Wharton 91 ; -Davisv. Moss, supra ; Overton
v. Williston, 7 Casey 155. The owner of the freehold in actual or
constructive possession, may maintain trover against a tort feasor,
who has no right to possession, but enters only casually or temporarily, and severs and removes property therefrom, yet a tenant
after the expiration of his term cannot maintain such action against
his landlord: Wright v. Guier, 9 Watts 172; Harlan v. Harlan,
3 Harris 507; Clement v. Wright, 4 Wright 250; Brewer v.
Fleming, 1 P. F. Smith 102.
Under the proceedings in bankruptcy, all right and interest of
plaintiffs to and in the premises and fixtures passed to the assignees
on their appointment. A few days thereafter they averred, of
record, that they had not used, and did not intend to use or occupy
the buildings or premises, further than to remove therefrom the
personal property of the bankrupts. They then consented that the
court make an order for them to deliver up, inter alia, immediate
possession of the premises to the defendant. He then took legal
possession of the premises, of which he appears to have had actual
before, and has continuously retained it since. The fact that the
right of property in machinery was afterwards to be determined,
did not affect the unconditional surrender of the premises to the
defendant, with its legal incidents. When, by decree of court, the
plaintiffs received the property from their assignees, they acquired
no other or greater interest than the assignees then held. If the
latter could not have recovered the machinery by action of trover,
the plaintiffs cannot.
Fixtures are not goods and chattels for all purposes. They are
not unless made so by the tenant's severance, or for the benefit of
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his execution-creditors. While they remain attached, they are part
of the freehold: Minstall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450; litackintosh
v. Trotter, 3 Id. 184; Overton v. Williston, supra. The fact of
an agreement between landlord and tenant, that the latter may remove fixtures at the end of his term, does not either permit him to
do so thereafter, nor enable him to maintain trover against the
owner of the premises, in case of his refusal to permit their removal: Minshall v. Lloy/d, supra; Overton v. Williston, supra.
If the plaintiff have any right of action it is not in this form. The
learned judge, therefore, committed no error in holding the action
of trover does not lie.
Judgment affirmed.,

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
STOUT v. STOPPEL.
In an action to recover the value of certain shelving and counters, the personal
property of plaintiff, and alleged to have been wrongfully converted by the defendant, Held, that under the evidence and instructions of the court in this case, the
verdict of the jury necessarily established the facts (1) that the relation of landlord
and tenant never existed between the parties to this action ; (2) that the shelving
and drawers described in the complaint were erected and placed in defendant's
building by plaintiff under a license from defendant, and under an agreement that
plaintiff might remove the same at pleasure, and hence that they never became a
part of the realty, but preserved their character as the personal chattels of plaintiff.
Beld, also, that having been erected and placed in defendant's building under this
license and agreement, and being capable of being severed and removed without
material injury to the building, an action for their wrongful conversion will lie
against the defendant, after demand upon him for permission to remove the same,
and a refusal on his part, although they are still attached to the building, and have
not been disannexed.

APPEAL

from order of District Court, County of Olmsted.

Oharles 0. Nilson, for appellant.
Jones &C ove, for respondent.
MITCHELL, J.-This is an action to recover the value of certain
shelving and counters, the personal property of plaintiff, and
alleged to have been wrongfully converted by defendant. The two
points urged by defendant here, as -well as in the court below, are
(1) that the property which is the subject of the action, being at-
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tached to and a part of the realty, this form of action will not lie;
(2) that the plaintiff having annexed the property to the building
of defendant while occupying it as his tenant, and, having failed to
remove it during his term, it became, under a familiar rule of law,
the absolute property of defendant.
As was suggested by the court below, the difficulty with this
argument is that it assumes that the property was a fixture, and
became a part of the realty, and that the relation of landlord and
tenant existed between the parties. These were the precise questions in issue under the pleadings, and in dispute under the evidence, and which were submitted, under proper instructions, to the
jury. Therefore their verdict necessarily establishes the facts that
the relation of landlord and tenant never existed between the parties, and that the property was put in the building by plaintiff by
the permission of defendant, and under an agreement on his part
that plaintiff might remove it at any time, and therefore that it
never became a part of the realty, but preserved its character as the
personal property of the plaintiff. It moreover appears that it was
capable of being severed and removed without material injury to
the building. The verdict is, in our opinion, amply sustained by
the evidence.
The general rule which obtains where the common-law distinctions between different forms of action are preserved, undoubtedly
is that replevin or trover will not lie for anything attached to the
realty. This proceeds upon the theory that it ceases to be a chattel by being affixed to the land, and becomes real property, but reducible again to a chattel state by separation from the realty, and
that replevin or trover will only lie for a chattel. It may well be
doubted whether the more sensible as well as logical rule would not
have been, that whenever the right of removal exists, the fixture
retains its chattel nature even 'during annexation, and that, therefore, trover or replevin would lie, even before severance from the
realty, in favor of him having the right of removal, against the
owner of the realty, who, upon demand, refuses him permission to
enter and remove.
But whatever may have been the propriety in common-law forms
of action of this rule invoked by defendant, it can have no application under our system of practice, in which all distinctions in the
forms of actions have been abolished; and, even under the commonlaw practice, the rule referred to was not applicable to articles in
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their nature furniture merely, which, though fastened to the walls
for safety or convenience, did not lose their character as personal
chattels, nor to houses or other structures built on the land of
another with his consent, and under an agreement, express or implied, that they should continue the personal property of the party
erecting them, notwithstanding that they had not been severed from
the land when the action was brought. Warner v. Kenning, 25
Minn. 173 ; Smith v. Benson, 1 Hill 176; Tifft v. Horton 53 N.
Y. 377; Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. St. 271; Osgood v. Howard, 6
Greenl. 452; Davis v. Taylor, 41 Ill. 405; Adams v. Goddard,
48 Me. 212; Gutlhrie v. Tones, 108 Mass. 191; Finney v. Watkins, 13 Mo. 291; YTilas v. .lfason, 25 Wis. 312. Therefore, the
plaintiffs having the right to remove this property, and defendant
having upon request refused him permission to enter the building
and remove it, an action would lie for damages for wrongful conversion, notwithstanding the fact that the property had not been
dissevered from the realty.
Order affirmed.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
SHAPERIA v. BARRY.
A wooden platform was erected for trade purposes, in defendant's building, by a
tenant who, becoming insolvent, assigned all his property, including his term and
the said platform, to the plaintiff for the benefit of'his creditors. Plaintiff, with defendant's consent, assigned the term to a third party, but reserved the platform, and
the right to enter and remove it. Upon entering for that purpose within a reasonable time, the defendant claimed to own the platform, and threatened to have plaintiff arrested for stealing, if he removed it. Reld, that an action lay against the defendant, the owner of the building, for the wrongful conversion of the platform, notwithstanding it was still annexed to the building.

APPEAL from judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of

St. Paul.
Walsh

Goforth, and . WI

Willis, for appellant.

O'Brien & BFller, for respondent.

'fITCEnLL, J.-This was an action for the wrongful conversion
of a wooden platform, the alleged personal property of the plaintiff.
The question for consideration is whether the findings of fact of the
court below are sustained by the evidence. Upon examination we
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think the evidence reasonably tends to prove the following state of
facts, to-wit: That the platform in question was erected in defendant's building by Finkelstein & Co., his tenants, while occupying it
as a furniture store; that they erected it with the knowledge and
consent of defendant, and at their own expense, to be used in displaying their goods; that it was fastened to four scantlings, which
were nailed to the walls of the building, the stairs to it being fastened at one end to the platform and at the other end to the floor;
that although it could not be removed without being taken apart,
yet it was capable of being severed and taken away without any
great injury to the building.
Finkelstein & Co. having become insolvent during the term of
their lease, executed to plaintiff a general assignment for the benefit
of creditors of all their property, including their lease of the building and the platform in controversy. The plaintiff, with consent
of defendant, assigned the unexpired term of the lease to ohie Walsh,
but reserving the platform, there being at the time an understanding between him, defendant, and Walsh, that he could come and
take it away at any time; that within a reasonable time the plaintiff came and entered the building for the purpose of removing it,
when defendant claimed it as his own property, and threatened to
have him arrested for steaing if he took it.
We think that this was sufficient to justify the court in finding
that in view of the relation of the parties as landlord and tenant,
and in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary, the
platform did not become a part of the realty, but remained the personal property of the tenant, with the right of removal, and that
this right had not terminated when plaintiff attempted to exercise
it. We also think that the conduct of defendant when plaintiff
attempted to remove the property was equivalent to a refusal to
permit him to do so, and obviated the necessity of any formal demand for it by plaintiff. Under those circumstances an action for
the wrongful conversion of the property will lie against defendant,
although it has never been severed from the building. Stout v.
Judgment affirmed.
Stoppel, ante.
GILFILLAN, C. J., being absent at the argument of this case on
account of illness, took no part in the decision.
The principal case of Darrahv. Baird,
is so clearly correct, both upon principle

and authority, that the citation of authorities would seem superfluous, but
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for the fact that other courts have come
to a contrary conclusion upon the same
point. Wherever the common-law forms
of action are retained, the action of trover
lies only for the conversion of personal
chattels. Tenant's fixtures, including
trade fixtures, during their annexation,
have generally been considered as part
of the land, though severable by the
tenant; and hence it has been generally
held that during the existence of such
annexation trover will not lie for their
conversion: Ex parte Quincy, 1 Atk.
478, per Lord HAnwIcn: Boffey v.
Henderson, 17 Q. B. 574; Colegrave v.
Dias Santos, 2 B. & C. 76 ; Longstaff v.
v. 3eagoe, 2 Ad. & E. 167 ; Faddin
v. Arnbld, 116 Mass. 270; Guthrie
v. Jones, 108 Id. 191 ; Prescott v.
Wells, 3 Nov. 82; Pierce v. Goddard,
22 Pick. 559 ;Overton v. ITilliston, 31
Pa. St. 155; and that neither a tenant
nor his assignee can maintain trover
against the landlord, or an incoming
tenant, for the recovery of fixtures left
by him annexed to the demised premises
after the expiration of the tenancy :
Lyde v. Russell, 1 B. & Ad. 394 ; illinshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450 ; Wilde
v. Waters, 16 0. B. 637; Roffey v.
Henderson, 17 Q. B. 574; Davis v.
Buffian, 51 Me. 160; Stockwell v.
M1farks, 17 Me. 455 ; Preston v. Briggs,
16 Vt. 129 ; EBx parte Reynal, 2 M., D.
& Do G. 461. There are some cases,
however, where tenants' fixtures were
considered by the court as personalty,
in which the rule is understood to be
otherwise. See Moore v. Wood, 12 Abb.
Pr. 393; Vilas v. Mason, 25 Wis.
327; Miller v. Baker, 1 Mlet. 27;
PeckV. Knox, I Sweeney 311 ; Finney
v. Watkins, 13 'o. 291. Granting the
premises assumed in these cases, that as
between landlord and tenant, fixtures removable by the tenant are personal property, the conclusion that trover lies,
follows naturally enough. The cases,
however, are open to the criticism that
their premises are incorrect, and opposed

to the weight of authority. It is a rule
of great antiquity that whatever is
affixed to the soil becomes a part of the
realty, and subject to the same riles of
law as the soil itself: Broom's Leg.
Max. 401; 10 Hen. VIL, 2 b; 20
Hen. VII. 13 ; 21 Hen. VII. 26; Co.
4,
Lit. 53, a.; Bract. Lib. 2, ch. 2,
6, fol. 9 b, 10 ; Fleta, Lib. 3, c. 2, 12,
fol. 176; Inst. 2, 1, 30, (Sandars' ed.);
D. 41, 1, 7, 12. Such being the rule,
the right of removal conferred by law
upon one not the owner of the soil, but
who has, for some purpose of his own,
made an annexation thereto more or less
temporary, arises not merely from his
interest in and dominion over the land,
but is a special privilege conferred by
the law in certain cases, from reasons of
public policy, upon certain classes of
persons, in derogation of what would
otherwise be the rights of the owner of
the soil. The nature of this right of removal has been explained in two ways:
by supposing that the chattel nature of
the thing is preserved after its annexation, or by considering that the thing
ceases to be a chattel by being affixed to
the land, and becomes realty, but reducible again to a chattel state by separation from the realty: Ferard Fix. 10.
There is some confusion and looseness of
expression among the authorities on this
subject, occasioned, probably, by the
fact that in some relations, and for some
purposes, as in favor of the execution
creditors, or the executors of a tenant,
the chattel nature df the thing is not lost
by its annexation. For many, if not
most purposes, however, during the continuance of the annexation, the thing
annexed is treated as a parcel of the
realty; and though it is in the power of
the party making the annexation to reduce it again to the chattel state, by severance, yet, till so severed, it remains a
part of the realty. See, generally, Lee
v. Risdon, 7 Taunt. 191 ; Hallen v. Runder, 1 Cr., M. & R. 275; Mackintosh
v. Trotter, 3 M1. & W. 184 ; .Minshall
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Iv. Lloyd, 2 Mf. & W. 450; Dumergue v.
Tumsey, 2 HI. & C. 790; Holland v.
Hodgson, L. R., 7 0. P. 336; Boyd
v. Shorrock, L. R., 5 Eq. 78; Barnett v.
Lucas, 5 In. Com. Law 140 ;-Lee v.
Gaskell, 45 L. J. (Q. B. D.) 540;
Bliss v. Whitney, 9 Allen 114; Jladdin
v. Arnold, 116 Mass. 270; Guthrie
v. Jones, 108 Id. 191; Preston v.
Briggs, 16 Vt. 129; Prescott v. Wells,
3 Nev. 82. In Minshall v. Lloyd, sup.,
FPncx, B., said: "The principle of law
is that ' quicquid solo plantatursolo ceditO
The right of a tenant is only to remove
during his tefm the fixtures he may
have put up, and so to make them cease
to be any longer fixtures. That right of
the tenant enables the sheriff to take
them under a writ for the benefit of the
tenant's creditors. I assent to the doctrine laid down in Coombs v, Beaumont,
5 B. & Ad. 72, and Boydell v. MeMichae, 1 C., Al. & R. 177, that such
fixtures are not goods and chattels within
the bankrupt law, though they are goods
and chattels when made such by the tenant's severance, or for the benefit of execution creditors."
The overwhelming weight of authority
being then that, as between landlord and
tenant, fixtures during their annexation
are to be considered as fixtures, there
can be no doubt of the correctness of the
principal case of Darrahv. Baird. The
principal case of Stout v. Stoppel, also,
in which the verdict of the jury negatived
the relation of landlord and tenant, and
established the fact that the things in
controversy were annexed under a
license and under an agreement that the
plaintiff might remove them at pleasure,
from which the deduction was made that
they never became a part of the realty,
is also unquestionably correct. See the
cases collected in Ewell on Fixtures 66,
67. The same cannot be said, however,
of the principal case of Shaperia v.
Barry. In that case it appears that the
relation of landlord and tenant did exist;
and the platform in question was un-

questionably a removable trade fixture.
The complaint is not set out in full, but
it is stated by the court, that the action
was for the wrongful conversion of the
platform as the personal property of the
plaintiff.
Now unquestionably even
where the common-law forms of actions'
are retained, an action on the case would
lie for wrongfully preventing the exercise of the right to sever and remove fixtures, and in such action the value of the
fixtures as removed may be recovered :
London, 6-c., Loan Co. v. Drake, 6 0. B.
(N. S.) 798. If, in the principal case
last mentioned, the facts are stated specially in the complaint, it will be conceded that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover; but, if, as appears to be the
case, the complaint was simply for the
conversion of goods and chattels, without
specially setting out the facts constituting
the alleged conversion, it is believed that
the decision is clearly erroneous. We do
not understand that the codes of procedure prevailing in the so-called code
States, are intended to change the substantial rights of the parties or the
nature of property. We suppose that in
all those States a recovery must be had,
if at all, according to the case stated in
the complaint. If such is the case, we
cannot understand how there can be a recovery in an action for the conversion of
personal property only, for that which
the proof shows was realty and not personalty. Granting the assumption of the
court that it is personal property, the decision is correct; but we have shown
that such an assumption is contrary to
the great weight of authority ; it is also
unsupported by the case of Stout v. Stoppel, for in that case the property was
clearly not a fixture at all, but mere personalty ; and the rest of the case, as to
the point now in question, i a mere dictum. The court, in Shaperie v. Barry,
say that "in the absence of any express
agreement to the contrary, the platform
did not become a part of the realty," &c.
We think that the rule is exactly the op-

